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RELEVANT FACTS 
Although the Appellees (the "Hesses") argue that the Appellants (collectively 
"Allen and Canberra") failed to marshal the evidence, the parties1 recitations of the 
material facts are essentially consistent. The primary differences occur where the Hesses 
engage in hyperbole, speculation, and/or distortion of the testimony (such as incorrect 
quotations of testimony, or taking testimony out of context as more fully explained 
below). The following factual issues illustrate the differences. 
What the AGEC Report Actually Says 
In an effort to show that Canberra and Allen had perfect knowledge and 
forewarning of the settlement of their house, the Hesses compress time and misquote both 
the testimony and the exhibits received at trial. For example, the Hesses frequently state 
that the AGEC Report reflected the presence of "collapsible soils" (or, even worse, "toxic 
soils") on Lot 41. See, e.g., Appellees' Brief at 6, 7, 8, 22-23. In fact, the AGEC Report 
was prepared in 1997. Tr. 521-22. Since the AGEC Report preceded the preparation of 
the subdivision plat map by several years, and the layout of the lots and streets was not 
known at the time of the AGEC Report, Tr. 613-15, the AGEC Report could not, and did 
not, make any references to specific lots upon which the test pits were dug. Hence, 
statements by the Hesses to the effect that the AGEC Report reflected the presence of 
collapsible soils on Lot 41 are simply not true. In retrospect, it is now known that test pit 
12 was located in what is now the back yard of the Hessesf property, Tr. 188, but there 
was no testimony establishing that Canberra and Allen knew at the time of the sale of Lot 
1 
41 (in 2004, seven years after the AGEC Report) that test pit 12 was on Lot 41. Tr. 521-
22. 
The AGEC Report also does not expressly state that there were "collapsible soils" 
found in test pit 12. There are only two portions of the report that reflect data or analysis 
pertaining to test pit 12. Those portions consist of: (1) Figure 3, which sets forth the logs 
of all twelve test pits (showing a cross-sectional representation of the soils encountered) 
(Figure 4 provides the legend and notes for the test pit excavations), and (2) Figure 6, 
which sets forth the results of a "consolidation test" on a soil sample taken from test pit 
12. Ex. 2, at Figure 2, Figure 4, and Figure 6, R. 4680. So that the Court can appreciate 
the highly technical nature of this data, Figures 3, 4 and 6 are reproduced in the 
Addendum to this Reply Brief. Applying the legend (Figure 4) to the log of test pit 12, a 
reader could derive that test pit 12 contained about one foot of topsoil, followed by eight 
feet of "silty gravel," underlain by two feet of "lean clay and silt," followed by one foot 
of "silty gravel," with four feet of "lean clay and silt" extending to the bottom of test pit 
12. Neither of the references to test pit 12 states that the soil is "collapsible," much less 
"toxic." 
The Hesses also claim that the evidence established the presence of "serious soils 
problem in the development generally . . . ," and that the report "detailed soil problems 
throughout the development." Appellees' Brief at 8, 22. Neither the AGEC Report nor 
any other evidence established that there were "serious soil problems in the development 
generally." In fact, the report states: 
2 
Most of the soils present within the study area consist of coarse granular 
soils which are typically not moisture sensitive. However, there appears to 
be localized areas of collapsible soils. We were not able to identify specific 
areas of concern due to the erratic nature of the clay and silt soils at the site. 
With the known erratic occurrence, we suggest that the owners be aware of 
the potentially moisture sensitive soils in the area and that excavation 
observations and drainage precautions contained in the geotechnical 
recommendations of this report be carefully followed. 
Ex. 2, at p. 10, R. 4680 (emphasis added).1 
The Hesses' geotechnical expert witness, James Nordquist, testified, "There is 
nothing [in the AGEC Report] that states that the area is unsuitable for development." Tr. 
204. In fact, Mr. Nordquist testified that if the soils in test pit 12 made the property in the 
area unsuitable for construction of a home, AGEC would have noted that fact in the 
report. Id. The Hesses presented no evidence that there were other incidents of settlement 
at any other house, garage, road, sidewalk or other improvement built within the 
subdivision. In short, there was no basis in the evidence actually in the Record for the 
Hesses1 assertions that there were serious problems in the subdivision generally, or even 
that the results of test pit 12 specifically gave notice that the area was unsuitable for 
development. 
Allen's Knowledge of Toxic Soils on Lot 41. 
1 This quotation also points out the proclivity of the Hesses1 brief to add inaccurate 
and unsubstantiated commentary to the testimony. In the last sentence of this quote, the 
Hesses inserted bracketed material, so that the sentence read, in pertinent part: "With the 
known erratic occurrence [of bad soils at the s i te] , . . ." Appellees1 Brief at 5. As is 
apparent from the entire quotation, the bracketed insert should read [of clay and silt soils 
at the site]. 
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Similarly, the Hesses' argument that Allen knew of "toxic soils" on Lot 41 is not 
supported by the record. As support for this contention, the Hesses1 repeatedly quoted 
David Allen's testimony as supposedly establishing that he "read through that report [the 
AGEC Report]. . ." See, e.g., Appellees1 Brief at 6, 7, 8, 22-23. In fact, the testimony, in 
context, was as follows: 
Q. (Mr. Baird:) Why didn't you read it [the AGEC Report] in 
detail, Mr. Allen? 
A. (The Witness:) It was similar to the others. None of the 
other homes we had any soils problems with them. The conclusions page 
[of the AGEC Report] was what I was very interested in. I'm not a 
geological expert. I read through that report and it really doesn't have much 
meaning or understanding for me. 
Tr. 612. 
In the same vein, the Hesses' brief asserts that although Mr. Tanner (the real estate 
agent for Canberrra who had all of the actual discussions with Mr. Hess about the 
purchase and who filled in all of the relevant documents for Mr. Allen to sign on behalf 
of Canberra) initially testified that he did not understand the AGEC Report, he ultimately 
"conceded that 'it's not all that complicated' and that he could 'follow those 
[recommendations] . . . ' , and that '[the recommendations in the AGEC Report are] 
something that builders need to know about, I suppose.'" Appellees' Brief at 6. Placed in 
context, however, Mr. Tanner's testimony spoke only to one specific recommendation of 
the AGEC Report, that "down spouts and drains should discharge well beyond the limits 
of any back fill." Tr. 98. Yet, the Hesses' cut, paste and insert job makes it sound like Mr. 
4 
Tanner conceded that interpreting and understanding the entire AGEC Report, including 
the recherche discussion of, was easy. 
The Jury's Award of Economic Damages Exceeded the Competent Evidence. 
At trial, the Hesses1 counsel argued to the jury that its award of economic damages 
should be approximately $330,000, noting that that amount was appropriate because it 
was less than the $536,750 limit established by the court's Instruction No. 18. R. 3749, 
Tr. 718-20. In particular, counsel requested that the jury award the following specific 
sums: 
1. $865.40 paid to Earthtec for investigation. See also Tr. 314; Ex. 17, R. 
4680. 
2. $9,752.28 paid to Terracon Consultants, Inc. for a soils study on the house. 
See also Tr. 330-31; Ex. 35, R. 4680. 
3. $24,483.00 and $186,777.50, or a total of $211,260.50, paid to Atlas Piers. 
See also Tr. 316; Ex. 20, R. 4680 (Atlas invoice dated July 25, 2005); Tr. 
328-30; Ex. 22, and 23, R. 4680. 
4. $ 108,179.12 as the cost of future repairs, in accordance with an estimate 
provided by Zions Builders. 
These sums totaled $330,057.30. 
Disregarding this argument and the evidence, the jury, getting only one number 
right, awarded $10,617.68 as the costs of investigation and discovery, R. 3749, Tr. 775; 
$330,057.30 as the costs of repair already made, R. 3749, Tr. 775; and an additional 
$206,692.70 as the costs of repairs to be made, R. 3749, Tr. 776, for a total of 
$536,750.00. While the Hesses concede that the jury made an error of $10,617.68 (in 
5 
post-trial proceedings, the District Court reduced the damages by that amount), they 
argue that the rest of the damages were supported by the evidence. 
The jury's award was not a "simple math error," as asserted in the Hesses1 brief 
(see Appellees1 Brief, p. 4, fn. 3). Instead, it was the product of simply disregarding the 
evidence and the jury instructions. The only element of the award that was supported by 
the evidence was the cost of investigation and discovery, $10,617.68. The Hesses 
claimed, and their evidence proved, the costs of repair already incurred were 
$211,260.50, not the $330,057.30 awarded by the jury. Similarly, the Hesses claimed, 
and their evidence proved, the future costs of repair were $108,179.12, not the 
$206,692.70 awarded by the jury. 
On appeal, the Hesses argue that the jury's award for past and future costs is 
supported by the evidence. With respect to cost of repairs already incurred, the Hesses 
argue that the jury's award is based upon the invoices from Atlas Piers, which total 
$211,260.50, plus uan estimate for repairs to the home from Zionfs Builders for 
$108,179.12." Appellees1 Brief at 45. Thus, the Hesses' argument is that an "estimate" 
(apparently made by the jury based on absolutely no actual proof) of the cost of future 
repairs is competent evidence of the cost of repairs already incurred. 
Continuing this Alice in Wonderland approach to the evidence, the Hesses then 
argue that the jury's award of costs of future repairs was appropriate, because that was 
simply the difference between the amount already determined by the jury (for costs of 
repair already incurred, which, as the Hesses concede, included the costs of repair yet to 
6 
be incurred) and the stipulated fair market value of the house if all settlement-related 
damages have been repaired (which the court instructed was the maximum amount that 
could be awarded for economic damages). Appellees1 Brief at 45, fn. 39. As further 
support, the Hesses argue that the jury could have reasonably come up with this amount 
because the house "does not include sidewalks, landscaping or any structures not attached 
to the home itself," and that if the Hesses want to build anything else, "they will be 
required to pay significant amounts of money to install additional piers." Appellees' Brief 
at 45. The Hesses do not cite to any evidence to support these assertions. There simply 
was no evidence presented at trial that any sidewalks or landscaping would have to be 
installed on piers, nor any evidence of the costs of such items. Additionally, the Hesses 
suggest that maybe the house could continue to settle, and, while they assert there was 
testimony to that effect, they do not cite where the record contains such testimony. 
Appellees1 Brief at 46, fn. 39. In fact, the Hesses1 witnesses testified that the home was 
2 The Hesses assert that their house "sunk nearly five inches, which is 
approximately ten times the normal amount of settling for a new home." Appellees' Brief 
at 22. The portion of the record cited as authority for this statement actually states that 
there is an elevation differential of five inches between different portions of the garage 
floor. When the Hesses' counsel tried to elicit the expert's opinion, "So it settled 5 inches 
from there?", the witness stated, "Not necessarily because a garage floor slab typically 
slopes toward the front of the garage." The cited portion of the transcript makes no 
reference as to the "normal amount of settling for a new home." Tr. 180-81. While the 
"normal amount" that a house may settle may be known to the Hesses' counsel, as a 
result of his cottage-industry in suing developers for soil settlement, that fact is not 
supported at Tr. 180-81. 
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stronger now than a home built without piers, Tr. 398, and would be "as good as new" on 
those items that were repaired. Tr. 418. 
In short, the jury's award of economic damages exceeded the amounts requested 
by the Hesses, and the outer limits of the competent evidence, by over $215,000, or 65%, 
which also illustrates that the verdict was the product of passion and prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
I. CANBERRA AND ALLEN HAVE PROPERLY MARSHALED THE 
EVIDENCE. 
The parties do not disagree as to the law applicable to the duty to marshal the 
evidence when challenging a factual determination. As noted by the Hesses, the 
obligation to marshal the evidence "is not intended to gratuitously oppress an appellant; 
rather it exists to facilitate a structured, realistic, and skeptical appraisal of facts without 
unduly compromising the adversarial process. At its core, the duty to marshal evidence 
contemplates that an appellant present 'every scrap of competent evidence introduced at 
trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists' and then 'ferret out a fatal 
flaw in the evidence/ becoming a 'devil's advocate."' In re E.H., 2006 UT 36, ^ f 64 
(citations omitted). Marshaling the evidence does not require that an appellant distort or 
misquote the exhibits or the testimony. 
As illustrated by the foregoing discussion of the evidence and the facts, Canberra 
and Allen have met their duty to marshal the evidence. On the factual issues specifically 
challenged in the Hesses' brief, Canberra and Allen have presented the competent 
8 
evidence actually introduced at trial, and have shown why it does not support the ultimate 
determination made by the jury. With respect to the jury's award of economic damages, 
the competent evidence (not to mention the Hesses' argument in closing) establishes that 
the award could not have exceeded $330,057.30, which was the sum total of all the costs 
incurred and to be incurred by the Hesses in remedying the settlement of their home. The 
Hesses' argument on appeal is, in essence, that the jury's excessive award was justified 
by speculation. 
The Hesses also assert that Canberra and Allen failed to marshal the evidence with 
respect to their knowledge of the contents of the AGEC Report. First, as set forth above, 
the Hesses make claims for the AGEC Report (e.g., that it showed "bad soils" on Lot 41) 
that are simply unsupported by the evidence, or any reasonable inference to be drawn 
from the report. The conscientious refusal of Canberra and Allen to concede that the 
AGEC Report states something that it simply does not state is not a failure to marshal. 
Second, the Hesses' repeated statement that Allen "read through that report [the AGEC 
Report]... ," has been shown to be a misquotation. Finally, Canberra and Allen have 
accurately and completely stated for the Court what the report actually states. The jury 
could have concluded that Canberra and Allen read the report thoroughly; however, the 
AGEC Report simply does not identify the presence of "bad" or "toxic" soils on Lot 41.3 
To reiterate, the Hesses' own witness stated that if the soils in test pit 12 made the 
3 As argued below at Point III, the jury should not, however, have been permitted to 
speculate about whether Canberra and/or Allen should have interpreted the AGEC Report 
as informing the reasonable developer of soils problems on what later became Lot 41. 
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property in the area unsuitable for construction of a home in the area, AGEC would have 
noted that fact in the report. Tr. 204. 
Canberra and Allen have presented the material evidence and testimony, and have 
presented the Court with an evaluation of the evidence that concedes the reasonable 
inferences that could be drawn by the jury. What the Canberra and Allen have not done is 
engage in speculation and distortion of the testimony and exhibits.4 
II. PROVING FRAUD REQUIRES ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE 
The Hesses failed, as a matter of law to produce sufficient evidence to support a 
claim for fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent nondisclosure because: 1) there is no 
evidence in the record that Canberra or, even more so, Allen, personally, knew or should 
have known that collapsible soils existed on the Hesses' lot; and 2) that Canberra or 
Allen withheld such knowledge about the soils on the lot from the Hesses. 
As far as Canberra and Allen can tell, this is the first soil settlement case in Utah 
to make it through a trial and then an appeal on the record of that trial.5 Of the applicable 
4 To ensure that the marshaling was complete, Allen and Canberra hired a seasoned 
appellate lawyer to review the Record and the transcript to ensure that nothing was 
omitted. 
5 Moore v. Smith, 158 P.3d 562, 568 (Utah Ct. App. 2007), went to trial, but not on soil 
settlement ("The Moores pursued three of their remaining claims at trial: ... fraudulent 
nondisclosure regarding the footings and grading, and fraudulent nondisclosure regarding 
the windows."). 
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precedents,6 each of the cases went up on appeal before trial. Therefore this case presents 
the Court with its first opportunity to review the application of fraudulent nondisclosure 
and fraudulent misrepresentation law, in action. It is unlikely that the Court envisioned 
that such application would allow a developer to be held liable for two claims of fraud 
with no showing of intent or actual knowledge. 
Yazd held "that a developer-builder may owe his buyer a duty to disclose 
information known to him about the composition or characteristics of any real property 
when that information is material to the suitability of the property purchased by the 
buyer." 143 P.3d 283, 285 (Utah 2006) (emphasis added). Canberra and Allen are not 
builders. Moreover, the undisputed testimony at trial was that Canberra and Allen met the 
duty this Court promulgated in Loveland v. Orem City, 146 P.2d 763, 769 (Utah 1987) 
(emphasis added); namely that a "developer has a duty to exercise reasonable care to 
insure that the subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some type of ordinary, 
average dwelling house." 
6 Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp,, 143 P.3d 283, 285 (Utah 2006) ("the district court 
granted Woodside's motion for summary judgment"); Mitchell v. Christensen, 31 P.3d 
572, 573 (Utah 2001) ("upholding the trial court's dismissal of Mitchell's claim against 
defendants"); Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235, 237 (Utah 2002) ("plaintiffs, ... appeal 
from an order granting a motion for summary judgment to defendants"); Smith v. 
Frandsen, 94 P.3d 919, 921 (Utah 2004) ("the trial court granted Mary Mel's motion for 
summary judgment"); Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 764 (Utah 1987) 
("plaintiffs seek reversal of three district court order granting defendants' motions for 
summary judgment"); Fennell v. Green, 11 P.3d 339, 341 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) ("the trial 
court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment"). 
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The District Court erred by allowing the jury to infer from the AGEC Report, 
alone, that Canberra and Allen "should have known," prior to the sale, of problematic 
soils on what later was designed by a licensed civil engineer to become Lot 41. From this 
evidence, the jury returned a verdict of fraudulent misrepresentation, without any 
evidence that Canberra or, especially, Allen knowingly made a single false or misleading 
statement. There was no evidence that Canberra or Allen made any misrepresentation to 
Mr. Hess (or, especially Mrs. Hess). In fact, Mr. Hess testified that he never had any 
communicatiou at all with Allen and did not even know that Allen was a principal at 
Canberra until well after the litigation commenced. 
There was no evidence that Mr. Hess was misled into believing that the soils were 
good- in fact the Seller's Disclosure states that Canberra does not know if collapsible 
soils exist. The Sellers Disclosure is the only evidence the Hesses produced relating to 
what Canberra represented about the soils at the time of the sale. In yet another example 
of how the Hesses conflate their case: 
First, Canberra and Allen were sellers of real property. ... As 
established in Mitchell and reiterated in Hermansen, as sellers 
of real property, Canberra and Allen had a duty to disclose 
the AGEC Report to the Hesses, which they failed to do. 
A seller's duty of disclosure could not be clearer. *** 
Therefore, Canberra and Allen - as sellers of real property -
owed a duty as a matter of law to disclose to the Hesses 
material known defects that could not be discovered by a 
reasonable inspection; they had a duty as a matter of law to 
disclose the AGEC Report. 
12 
(Appellees' Brief at 18 (emphasis in original).)7 There are two problems with this 
argument: 1) The Mitchell and Hermansen courts did not say that Canberra and Allen had 
a duty to disclose the AGEC Report;8 and 2) the Hesses put on no evidence that Canberra 
7 The Hesses yet again attempt to place Canberra and Allen in the same liability boat and 
cite the Court to Addendum C, the Seller's Disclosures and Addendum D, the Warranty 
Deed. Neither of these documents support that Allen, personally, was a "seller." Instead, 
Allen signed both documents, prepared by Tanner, as the CEO of Canberra. 
8 The Mitchell Court said that "what constitutes reasonable care in the discovery of 
defects, [is] whether the defect would be apparent to ordinary prudent persons." Mitchell 
v. Christensen, 31 P.3d 572, 575 (Utah 2001). The Court went on to say "although the 
proper standard for the discovery of a defect is that of an ordinary prudent person, this 
does not mean that inspection by an expert will never be required." Id. The Court 
concluded "that the Christensens had a legal duty to disclose the leaks in the swimming 
pool prior to the sale of their property to Mitchell, assuming it is determined on remand 
that the Christensens knew of the existence of the leaks." Id. at 576 (emphasis added). 
The Hermansen Court stated the Mitchell holding as: "sellers of real property owe a duty 
to disclose material known defects that cannot be discovered by a reasonable inspection 
by an ordinary prudent buyer." Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235, 242 (Utah 2002) 
(emphasis added). Here, Mr. Hess admitted that he did not hire any experts to do an 
inspection on the property before his purchase, and this of course begs the question, that 
went unanswered at trial, and has thus far gone unanswered in the appellate courts—was 
that prudent? See Moore v. Smith, 158 P.3d 562, 574, fn. 13 ("we also note that the Yazd 
decision did not address the possible relevance of not obtaining a home inspection or 
obviousness of defects.") More importantly, and crucially, there was no evidence put on 
that Canberra or Allen knew about the potential of the soils on the Hesses' lot to settle. 
And, Mr. Hess also failed to obtain a soils test by a geological engineer, as "strongly 
recommended" in the house construction plans. Tr. 451; Ex. 33, R. 4680; Tr. 500-01. 
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or Allen knew that the lot sold to the Hesses had any defects. Arguably, if the Hesses had 
put on evidence that Canberra or Allen actually knew that Lot 41 actually had a soils 
problem and actually failed to disclose that fact, liability might follow if the builder and 
the relevant subcontractors had later performed their work flawlessly. 
Tellingly, there was no evidence that anything was said or not said, or written or 
not written, by Canberra or Allen that was relevant to Mark Hess' decision to enter into 
the transaction. "Fraudulent concealment... requires the seller to have acted 'knowingly 
or recklessly9."' Moore v. Smith at 574, fn. 12. The Hesses failed to put on any evidence 
that Canberra or Allen 1) willfully failed to disclose any information that Canberra or 
Allen had, and 2) that Canberra or Allen understood that the AGEC Report was material 
to the suitability of Lot 41 for construction; therefore, the Hesses failed to prove that 
Canberra or Allen had the requisite knowing or reckless state of mind to commit fraud. 
Contrary to the case at bar, in Maack v. Resource Design & Const., Inc., 875 P.2d 
570, 578 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (another case decided on summary judgment), where a 
seller had actual doubts about the integrity of the stucco on the home and did not disclose 
anything related to such doubts, the Court determined that the seller could not be held 
liable, since the buyer did not hire any inspectors to conduct inspections. Likewise, a 
9 "[Negligent misrepresentation 'carries a lesser mental state, requiring only that the 
seller act carelessly or negligently.' Fraudulent concealment, on the other hand, requires 
the seller to have acted 'knowingly or recklessly.'" Moore v. Smith, 158 P.3d 562, 574, 
fn. 12 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). The Hesses did not plead 
"negligent representation" against Canberra or Allen. 
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seller was held not liable in Fennell v. Green, 11 P.3d 339 (Utah Ct. App. 2003), where 
the developers had two soils reports10 prepared, including one report that was specific to 
the lot relating to the dispute, and both reports were on file with the City. After a home 
was built there was a landslide that caused damage and the Court "determine[d] that 
Fennelfs fraudulent nondisclosure claim fails because there were no facts presented to 
show that Wall or Green knew of a possible landslide condition on lot 31." Id. at 343. 
Here, Canberra did not have a soils report specific to Lot 41 (a lot that had, again, been 
designed by a licensed professional engineer and approved by another engineer for 
Lindon City) and there is no evidence that Canberra or Allen were aware of potential 
soils problems, yet a jury held each liable on claims of fraud for such problems. 
Comparing the outcomes of Maack and Fennell, to the case at bar, illustrates the 
problems with the application of fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent 
misrepresentation law in Utah - at least the law as interpreted by the Hesses. 
In this case, the party that had a legal responsibility under Utah law to the Hesses 
was their builder. "Where a developer [Canberra] conveys property to a residential 
contractor [the builder that constructed the Hesses' home], the knowledge and expertise 
of the builder [not Canberra or Allen], and the independent duties owed thereby, interrupt 
10 In fact, there was a subdivision-wide soils report, prepared for the developers, and 
thereafter a lot specific soils report was prepared, for the developers, which showed a 
scarp existed on the lot. Fennell at 340. Here, the AGEC report was a subdivision wide 
report prepared for Canberra before the subdivision was platted, and at no time did 
Canberra have a report specific to Lot 41. The Hesses, of course, were repeatedly advised 
to have their own such report, which they repeatedly failed to do. 
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certain obligations running from the initial developer [Canberra] to subsequent 
purchasers [the Hesses]." Smith v. Frandsen at 925. Here, the soils report was on file with 
the City for the builder to review. The builder,1 x not Canberra (or Allen), had the duty to 
determine design parameters to build an average ordinary home on the lot purchased by 
the Hesses. 
Although the Hesses claim that they know the law and can apply it better than the 
Utah Court of Appeals, the Anderson Court correctly interpreted Smith when it found that 
11 Appellees claim that the Appellants' block quote on p. 44 of its Brief relating to a 
builders duty is "not found in Smith or any other Utah case." (Appellees' Brief at 34.) 
Appellants apologize for citing only Smith instead of also recognizing that part of the 
quote was from Jury Instruction Number 20. The first part of the block quote is, in fact, 
from Smith: "[T]he duties owed by ... developers are not without limitation. Even where 
a duty is found to exist, it does not continue indefinitely. Absent intentional fraud, it 
continues only until the buyer has adequate time and opportunity, through occupation of 
the land or otherwise, to discover the existence of the condition, to take effective 
precautions against it by repair or other means." Smith ^fl7. The second portion was the 
agreed upon jury instruction and that language was also taken from Smith, albeit from a 
different paragraph of the opinion. "In particular, builder-contractors are expected to be 
familiar with conditions in the subsurface of the ground." Smith at ^fl9. u[T]he court 
relied on the knowledge and judgment of the builder in finding that the developer had 
satisfied his duty and was not liable to homeowners. Likewise, our decision today 
requires contractors to be accountable, either directly or through explicit warranties from 
their predecessors in title, for the suitability of the land upon which they build." Smith at 
1123. 
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a developer who did not build the home, which settled, had its liability under Yazd 
severed. Anderson v. Kriser, 2009 UT App 319 at f 6. 
In Smith, this Court cited three cases where a developer was found liable. Id. at 
f24. None of these three cases is similar to the case at bar. The first case cited is 
Barnhouse v. City of Pinole, 133 Cal.App.3d 171 (1982). There, the developer was aware 
that the land had "springs and slides on the proposed subdivision site." Id. at 177. The 
developer did not advise prospective purchasers of "preexisting slides and springs." Id. at 
178. Thereafter, a slide damaged the property and the developer misrepresented that he 
had actually fixed the problem and did not inform the purchasers that damage could 
happen again in the future. Id. at 179. Finally, the property owners had expert testimony 
at trial supporting their theory that the developer's actions caused the damage. Id. at 189. 
Unlike Barnhouse, Canberra and Allen 1) were not aware of any soils problems, 2) did 
not attempt to fix such problem and then misrepresent that the problem would not occur 
in the future, and 3) the Hesses did not provide expert testimony that Canberra's or 
Allen's actions caused their damages. 
The second case cited is Washington Rd. Developers, LLC v. Weeks, 249 Ga. App. 
582, 549 S.E.2d 416 (2001), where the developer hired the builder and sold the 
completed home to the buyer. Id. at 582. The Washington Rd. Court specifically 
addressed the situation at bar, where the developer is not the builder, and stated that the 
developer is not liable for problems relating to the duties of the builder. Id. at 585. The 
third case cited is Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979). The 
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Moxley holding is quite similar to the decision in Washington Rd., as the Court discusses 
the duties of builders. 
We can see no difference between a builder or contractor who 
undertakes construction of a home and a builder-developer. 
To the buyer of a home the same considerations are present, 
no matter whether a builder constructs a residence on the land 
of the owner or whether the builder constructs a habitation on 
land he is developing and selling the residential structures as 
part of a package including the land. 
Id. at 735. It is undisputed that neither Canberra nor Allen was the builder of the Hesses 
home and therefore this Court should adopt the Anderson decision, which correctly 
applies applicable precedent, as the law. 
III. WHAT CANBERRA OR ALLEN "SHOULD HAVE KNOWN" ABOUT 
COLLAPSIBLE SOILS ON LOT 41 REQUIRES EXPERT TESTIMONY 
This Court determined in Smith, "like developers, the law imputes to builders and 
contractors a high degree of specialized knowledge and expertise with regard to 
residential construction." Id. at |^18 (emphasis added). "Expert testimony is especially 
considered unnecessary, although helpful, in cases involving trades or professions that do 
not require a high degree of specialized knowledge ...." Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Products, 
939 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Because the Smith Court found that being a 
developer requires a high degree of skill, the standard of care and any alleged breach of 
such standard, by Canberra, a developer (or Allen as the owner of a development 
company) requires expert testimony, as discussed in Ortiz. The Hesses should have 
named an expert to testify that a development company, and the owner of a development 
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company, would have read the AGEC Report and, from it, should have known that it said 
that there was the potential for soil settlement to occur on the Hesses' lot (even though 
the lot was approved by a licensed professional engineer for Lindon City, who was in 
possession of the AGEC Report but who made no such warning). Instead, the jury was 
allowed to speculate that by reading a scientific report that Canberra and Allen knew 
that the Hesses' lot had soils problems, and withheld such knowledge from the Hesses. 
In a similar case, where settling damage occurred, the Supreme Court of Wyoming 
held that a developer could not be held liable for the damage because the plaintiffs failed 
to show that the developer breached the standard of care, because the lots that it sold 
"were suitable for the construction of ordinary dwelling houses" and that the developer 
"had no control over the type of house to be constructed on each lot." Reoh v. Suchor 
Investments, Inc., 699 P.2d 284, 287 (Wyo. 1985). Likewise, here: 1) the Hesses' witness 
testified that an ordinary average home could have been built on this lot, satisfying the 
developers' duty created in Loveland; and 2) neither Canberra nor Allen had anything to 
do with the actual building of the house. 
This dispute is not analogous to Schreiter v. Wasatach Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570, 
574 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), as the Hesses claim, because in that case there was no legal 
12 The parties in a position to understand the potential for soils problems on the Hesses' 
lot - AGEC, the preparer of the report; the civil engineer hired by Canberra to plat the 
subdivision; the Lindon City engineer who recommended that the subdivision be 
approved - are not parties to this suit. Instead, Canberra and Allen were held liable when 
the jury was allowed to presume Canberra and Allen understood from the AGEC report 
that the soils on the Hesses' lot were "toxic." 
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authority that retirement home operators were in a field requiring a high degree of skill 
"where the average person has little understanding of the duties owed." Here the Hesses 
claim that "Canberra and Allen not only received the AGEC Report, but they also read it 
and knew about the potential for soils problems in the development," (Appellees' Brief at 
24), and the Hesses claim this should make Schreiter applicable. 
Without any expert testimony about what a reasonable development company 
(Canberra) or a reasonable owner of a development company (Allen) could reasonably 
understand from the AGEC Report, the jury was allowed to speculate from the mere 
existence of the report itself that Canberra and Allen "should have known" about the 
settlement problems experienced by the Hesses. Expert testimony was needed so the jury 
had parameters to make the determination that Canberra and Allen's actions toward the 
Hesses breached their standard of care, Downing v. Hyland Pharmacy, 194 P.3d 944, 948 
(Utah 2008), "in the locality." Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher & Assoc, 24 Utah 2d 172, 
476 P.2d 610, 615 (Utah 1970). 
IV. THE DAMAGES AWARDED IN THIS CASE WERE EXCESSIVE 
Although the standard for overturning a jury verdict is high, the appellate courts 
job is to review the evidence and determine if evidence "was presented at trial upon 
which a reasonable, fair jury" could make the decision that was made. Ortiz v. Geneva 
Rock Products, Inc., 939 P.2d 1213, 1218 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Pursuant to Rule 
59(a)(5), Utah R. Civ. P., the damages found by the jury in this case, both the economic 
and the noneconomic damages, were "excessive," as the total damages returned, 
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approximately $3.1 million, were nearly ten times the specific hard costs, of 
approximately $330,000, presented to the jury. 
As noted in the Facts above, the damages awarded for costs of investigation, 
repairs to date, and future repairs, ignored the District Court's instructions and were 
directly against the evidence. Since the costs of repairs, past and future, awarded by the 
jury exceeded the evidence that the Hesses presented at trial, it is apparent that the 
damages awarded were given under the "influence of passion or prejudice." 
We do not doubt that when a verdict is so grossly disproportionate to any 
amount of damages which could have been fairly awarded as to make 
manifest that the verdict was so suffused with passion and prejudice that 
the defendant could not have had a fair trial on the issues, the trial court 
should grant a new trial. *** 
Notwithstanding what was said therein, we regard the true role to be that 
if the verdict is so excessive as to show that it must have been motivated 
by prejudice or ill will toward the litigant, or that passion such as anger, 
resentment, indignation or some kindred emotion has so overcome or 
distorted the jury's reason that the verdict is vindictive, vengeful or 
punitive, it should be unconditionally set aside. 
M. Stamp v. Union Pac. R. Co., 5 Utah 2d397, 303 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1956) 
(emphasis added), quoting Wheat v. Denver R. G. W. R. Co., 250 P.2d 932, 935 
(Utah 1951). 
In reviewing the award of noneconomic, or pain and suffering damages, this Court 
should reverse a verdict where the amount is so excessive that it appears to have been the 
product of "passion or prejudice." Duffy v. Union Pac. R. Co., 118 Utah 82, 89, 218 P.2d 
1080, 1083 (Utah 1950). Canberra and Allen have properly marshaled and presented to 
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this Court the claims and testimony of the Hesses that bear on their pain and suffering. 
While monetizing those claims is admittedly an imprecise task, and within broad 
parameters left to the discretion of the jury, Canberra and Allen are not reticent in 
asserting that an award of $2,625 million substantially exceeds the limits of a reasonable 
award, and thus appears to be the result of passion and prejudice, rather than a 
consideration of the evidence. 
A comparison of the instruction given to the jury on this issue (Inst. No. 17, R. 
3742) to the evidence and the outcome demonstrates that the verdict was far beyond the 
bounds of a reasonable award. Instruction No. 17 advised the jury that its award should 
be "the amount of money that will fairly and adequately compensate the Hesses for losses 
other than economic losses." The instruction outlines the following matters that the jury 
could consider in determining the amount of the noneconomic losses: 
1. "The nature and extent of damages." To the extent this instruction 
advises the jury to consider the amount of its award of economic damages, the jury's 
blatant disregard of the evidence and the court's instruction on economic damages13 
justifies a reversal of the noneconomic damages award. To the extent the instruction 
directs the jury to consider the "nature and extent" of the Hesses' noneconomic damages, 
13 Presumably, if economic damages are incorrectly awarded by a jury the non-
economic damages are likewise incorrect. "Economic damages ... are not restricted, 
presumably because they are less likely to be exaggerated by a jury, and also because 
they are "hard" amounts, subject to careful calculation." Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 
138 (Utah 2004) (emphasis added). 
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the evidence put on by the Hesses was nothing like that put on in Andreason v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co., 848 P.2d 171, 176, where the plaintiff "meticulously testified 
from his personal written records of expenses." Here the only specifically identified 
economic hard costs relating to the Hesses' pain and suffering claim are: the garage sale 
of the air hockey table, the ping pong table, and video equipment; the sale of Mrs. Hess5 
wedding ring; and, bottles of Pepto Bismol. Further, there was no evidence that the 
Hesses experienced "large wages losses, considerable medical costs, permanent 
disability, loss of bodily function, gross disfigurement...." Duffy at 90, 1084. This case 
illustrates the problem with the blanket claim of "pain and suffering;" namely that a jury 
can return an absurdly large verdict that has no connection to the injury itself and without 
the legal parameters that are in place to protect a defendant against an unusually large 
punitive damages14 verdict. 
2. "The Hesses' mental pain and suffering," "The extent to which the 
Hesses have been prevented from pursuing their ordinary affairs/' and "The extent 
to which the Hesses have been limited in the enjoyment of life." Substantially all of 
the direct testimony from the Hesses on these considerations is found at two points in the 
transcript, Ms. Hess' testimony at Tr. 559-62, and Mr. Hess' testimony at Tr. 334-35. 
14 It bears repeating that the trial court did not allow the jury to consider punitive 
damages, even though the only claims against Canberra and Allen were for fraud. 
Somehow the District Court determined that even though Canberra and Allen were found 
liable for intentional torts, there was no evidence of Canberra's and Allen's intent to 
commit the intentional torts to support punitive damages. 
23 
The evidence establishes that the situation was traumatic and frightening to the Hesses, it 
affected their family life and marriage, and occupied their lives; however, it was not so 
traumatic and frightening that the Hesses left the house. In essence, the evidence was that 
the situation was bad, but not so unbearable that the Hesses fled the home. Canberra and 
Allen do not contend that the Hesses did not have pain and suffering, but instead that the 
award is simply not commensurate with the evidence. 
3. "Whether the consequences of these injuries are likely to continue and 
for how long." There was no testimony that once the home was repaired that the Hesses 
were going to suffer "diminished enjoyment of life," Judd v. Rowley's Cherry Hill 
Orchards, Inc., 611 P.2d 1216, 1221 (Utah 1980). In fact, the testimony was that the 
settlement issues had been repaired, and that only the cosmetic repairs to the house 
remained to be completed. 
Even though there is no set formula for determining pain and suffering damages, 
the damages still must be proved with certainty and with a "preponderance of the 
evidence and the amount of damages by approximations and projections that rise above 
mere speculation." Richards v. Brown, 222 P.3d 69, 83 (Utah Ct. App. 2009), quoting 
Andreason, 848 P.2d at 176. The Hesses give a nod to the speculative nature of their 
damages in their Brief by mentioning that the jury probably determined that it was okay 
to give them money to build "sidewalks, a swimming pool, a fence, a shed, a rock wall, a 
patio." (Appellees' Brief at 45.) Due to the lack of evidence, and the apparent passion and 
prejudice of the jury relating to the damages awarded, the Court should vacate the pain 
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and suffering damages, or remand this matter for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The verdict of the jury on the Hesses1 fraud claims cannot be sustained, as a matter 
of law. Thus, the jury's verdict should be vacated, or at a minimum the Court should 
remand this matter for a new trial. Finally, the damages awarded by the jury simply were 
not supported by the evidence at trial and these should be vacated, or the Court should 
remand this matter for further proceedings with the trial court. 
y\$ DATED this ^ v day of May, 2010 
Dallis A. Nordstrom 
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ADDENDUM 
Figures 3,4 and 6 of the AGEC Report. 
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